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Abstract 
 
This thesis attempts to understand who fought for influence within the European Union’s 
policy area of the Emissions Trading System (ETS). The ETS is a key aspect of the 
European Union’s (EU) climate change policy and is particularly important in light of the 
conclusions at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. It was first 
established in 2003 with Directive 2003/87/EC and completed its first major revision in 
2008 with Directive 2009/29/EC. Between these two key Directives, the interplay between 
industrial and environmental incentives means that the ETS has created a dynamic venue 
for divergent interest groups. So as to identify the relevant actors, this paper applies the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Sabatier. Using position papers, semi-structured 
interviews, and unpublished documents from the EU institutions, this paper answers it 
primary research question in its identification of an economy-first and an environment-first 
lobbying coalition. These coalitions have expanded over time with the environment-first 
coalition incorporating Greenpeace and the economy-first coalition expanding even further 
in both scope and speed. However, the economy-first coalition has been susceptible to 
industry-specific interests. In its application of the ACF, the research shows that a 
hypothesised effect between the ACF’s external events and these lobbying coalitions is 
inconclusive. Other hypotheses stemming from the ACF relating to electricity prices and 
the 2004 enlargement seem to be of significance for the relative composition of the 
lobbying coalitions. This paper finds that there are certain limitations within the ACF. The 
findings of this thesis provide a unique insight into how lobbying coalitions within a key EU 
policy area can form and develop. 
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According to Newton Dunn, “anybody goes into politics…to change things. If you 
believe in something, then you fight for it”1. Mr. Dunn was shadow-rapporteur for the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) Directive in 2003 ETS. The ETS is 
identified by the European Commissions as being the “key tool for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions from industry at the lowest costs”2. Accordingly, the ETS acts as a cap-and-
trade system upon emissions and initially restricted the amount of annual emissions in 
accordance with the EU’s commitments to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Bredin and Muckley 
describe how the “ETS allows firms to trade the amount of emission permits that they hold 
and as a result has applied a market value to this externality”3. Interestingly, the dual goal 
of having a market value and also reducing emissions means that the ETS has become a 
dynamic lobbying venue for both environmental and market-driven interest groups.  
The “significant public policy experiment”4 of the ETS was initially introduced with 
Directive 2003/87/EC and had its first major revision with Directive 2009/29/EC. During 
this time, certain economic interests  have declared that the “ETS has a significant impact 
on the competitiveness”5 of their industries, while some Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) 
decry that the ETS is “an abject failure”6 and that it is “obstructing other tried and tested 
measures that would lead to more certain results”7. Certain bodies have gone even further 
in declaring that the “ETS must be abolished no later than 2020”8.  
Given the prominence of the ETS, it is necessary to understand the lobbying 
groups that mobilised themselves around this policy between the initial Directive 
2003/87/EC and the amending Directive 2009/29/EC. This is a unique case for 
examination as it provides an insight into lobbying coalitions over an extended period of 
                                                 
I would like to thank my mother and late father, who have been a constant source of support. Finally, my 
special thanks are extended to all friends and family that were subjected to reading any of my work on 
“that European stuff”. 
 
1
 Interview with Mr. Bill Newton Dunn, Former-MEP (ALDE), Telephone, 22 April 2015. 
2
 European Commission, ‘EU Action on Climate’, retrieved 03 April 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/ 
3
 D. Bredin and C. Muckley, ‘An Emerging Equilibrium in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’, Energy 
Economics, vol. 33, 2011, p. 353. 
4
 A. D. Ellerman, F. J. Convery, and C. de Perthuis, Pricing Carbon: The European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. xvii. 
5
 The European Chemical Industry Council, ‘Implementing the EU Emissions Trading System’, retrieved 05 
April 2015, http://www.cefic.org/Policy-Centre/Energy/Emissions-Trading-System-ETS/ 
6
 Friends of the Earth Europe, ‘The EU Emissions Trading System: Failing to Deliver’, 01 October 2010, p. 2, 
retrieved 05 April 2015, 
https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/FoEE_ETS_failing_to_deliver_1010.pdf 
7
 Ibid., p. 10. 
8
 Scrap the ETS, ‘No EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Declaration’, retrieved 06 April 2015, http://scrap-the-
euets.makenoise.org/KV/declaration-scrap-ets-english/ 
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time, between 2003 and 2009. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) provides a 
theoretical framework that identifies Advocacy Coalitions which act within policy 
subsystems such as the ETS.  The ACF has been developed “to deal with intensive public 
policy problems”9 and is recognised as “one of the most ambitious policy frameworks”10. 
This paper applies the ACF in order to answer its key research question of what advocacy 
coalitions formed between the 2003 and 2009 ETS Directives. Moreover, this paper 
explores a new ACF-based hypothesis which examines the unique dynamics between 
these advocacy coalitions and what the ACF classifies as external events. In carrying out 
research, interviews were conducted and several published, and unpublished, documents 
were analysed. 
Ultimately, research revealed that two distinct lobbying coalitions had formed 
within the ETS policy area, these are classified as economy-first and environment-first, 
Interestingly, these coalitions do not contain all the actors and stakeholders between the 
2003 and 2009 Directives, and they also vary in size, with the environment-first coalition 
expanding much less than the economy-first coalition between the Directives. The 
environment-first lobbying coalition had a more stable membership than the economy-first 
coalition. Furthermore, a key finding of this paper includes the observation that certain 
external system events seem to affect the membership of coalitions. However, it is duly 
noted that no dominant external event can be identified and that this interpretation may be 
due to the inelasticity of the ACF in relation to external events. 
The subsequent section provides a theoretical explanation concerning the ACF. 
Consequently, the ACF is applied to the ETS. The following section outlines what the ACF 
determines to be relatively stable parameters, and then a new hypothesis that connects 
the ACF’s external events to the size of the lobbying coalitions is tested. The final section 
provides a summation and conclusory note. 
 
  
                                                 
9
 C. M. Weible and P. A. Sabatier, ‘A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework’, in Fischer, F., Miller, G. 
J., and Sidney, M. S., (eds.), Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics and Methods, Boca 
Raton, Taylor Francis Group, 2007, p. 123. 
10
 P. Cairney, ‘Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: The Advocacy Coalition Framework’, Politics and Public 
Policy, p. 4, retrieved 10 March 2015,  https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2013/10/30/policy-
concepts-in-1000-words-the-advocacy-coalition-framework/ 
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1. The Advocacy Coalition Framework and Research Procedure 
The ACF has been heralded as “one of the most ambitious policy frameworks 
which tries to provide an overview of the entire policy process”11.  Despite an original focus 
on the American political system, the ACF has been revised “to deal explicitly with 
European corporatist regimes”12.  
At the macro-level, the ACF assumes that “most policy-making occurs among 
specialists within a policy subsystem but that their behaviour is affected by factors in the 
broader political and socioeconomic system”13. A policy subsystem is characterised by 
both a functional/substantive dimension and a territorial one, in this case climate change 
policy and the EU, respectively. Notably, Sabatier et al. acknowledge the inherent 
difficulties in defining the appropriate scope of a subsystem due to the “existence of 
overlapping and nested subsystems”14. While the macro-level denotes the presence of 
‘specialists” within the subsystem, it is necessary to acknowledge that these specialists, 
or policy participants, come from all levels of government, interest groups, research 
organisations and the media15. Furthermore, “the behaviour of policy participants within 
the subsystem, is…affected by two sets of exogenous factors”, namely the ‘Relatively 
Stable Parameters’ and the ‘External Subsystem Events. ’The relatively stable parameters 
are “stable over long periods of time, approximately 100 years or more”16; they are unlikely 
to change and represent issues such as a “constitutional structure” and “fundamental 
sociocultural values”. Conversely, the ACF’s ‘External Subsystem Events’ can be subject to 
change and are identified as issues such as public opinion and socioeconomic conditions. 
Turning to the micro-level, the ACF utilises a model of the individual that “is drawn 
heavily from social psychology”17. In this respect, Sabatier et al. align themselves to the 
work of March and Olsen with the concepts of a “logic of appropriateness” and a “logic of 
consequences”18. The ACF ascertains that individuals filter information according to their 
pre-existing beliefs and are “very suspicious of people with dissimilar beliefs”19. Scholars 
within the field of the ACF have further broken down this mode of the individual into a 
                                                 
11
 Cairney, op. cit., p. 4. 
12
 P. A. Sabatier and C. M. Weible, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications’, in P. 
Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Colorado, Westview Press, 2007, 2nd edn., p. 190. 
13
 Ibid., p. 191. 
14
 Ibid., p. 193. 
15
 Weible et al., ‘Guide to the ACF’, op. cit. pp. 124-125. 
16
 Weible et al., ‘Guide to the ACF’, loc. cit. 
17
 Sabatier et al., ‘Innovations’, op. cit., pp. 191-191. 
18
 Sabatier et al., ‘Innovations’, op. cit., p. 194. 
19
 Weible et al., ‘Guide to the ACF’, op. cit., p. 127. 
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three-tiered belief system of deep core, policy core, and secondary beliefs. Deep core 
beliefs are “very resistant to change”20 and are their change is seen as being “akin to a 
religious conversion”21. Policy core beliefs are normative/empirical beliefs that are still 
resistant to change but are more malleable than the deep core beliefs. A suitable example 
would be an actor’s views on the “proper balance between government and market”22. On 
the lowest tier stands secondary beliefs, which are empirical beliefs and policy 
preferences. These beliefs have been identified as being “most susceptible to change in 
response to new information and events”23. 
At the meso-level, it is contested that “the best way to deal with the multiplicity of 
actors in a subsystem is to aggregate them into ‘advocacy coalitions’”24. Accordingly, 
these advocacy coalitions bring together organisations and individuals who “engage in 
politics to translate their beliefs into action”25. Stemming from the belief system at the 
micro-level, the ACF assumes that “policy core beliefs are the fundamental ‘glue’ of 
coalitions because they represent basic normative and empirical commitments”26. 
Furthermore, while they “share a set of normative and causal beliefs”, an identifiable 
advocacy coalition must “often act in concert”27. As noted by Weible et al., this feature, 
often referred to as a nontrivial degree of coordination28, is frequently overlooked in the 
literature29. The ACF identifies a policy subsystem of meso-level advocacy coalitions 
grouped according to their micro-level beliefs, and they can be affected by the macro-level 
of stable parameters and external events.  
 
Research Agenda and Procedure 
Having discussed the ETS and the ACF, the question arises on what advocacy 
coalitions emerged in the ETS and how did external factors characterise or influence their 
                                                 
20
 Weible et al., ‘Guide to the ACF’, loc. cit. 
21
 H. C. Jenkins-Smith and P. A. Sabatier, ‘Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework’, Journal of Public 
Policy, vol. 14, no. 2, 1994, p. 175. 
22
 Cairney, op. cit., p. 2. 
23
 Cairney, loc. cit. 
24
 Sabatier et al., ‘Innovations’, op. cit., p. 192. 
25
 Cairney, loc. cit. 
26
 P. A. Sabatier, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 5, no. 1, 1998,, p. 103. 
27
 Sabatier, ‘An ACF of Policy Change’, op. cit., p. 133. 
28
 P. A. Sabatier and H. Jenkins-Smith, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment’, in P. Sabatier 
(ed.), Theory of the Policy Process, Colorado, Westview Press, 1999, p. 120. 
29
 C. M. Weible, P. A. Sabatier, and K.McQueen, ‘Themes and Variations: Taking Stock of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework’, The Policy Studies Journal, vol. 37, no. 1, 2009, p. 132. 
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development? This paper formulates a new hypothesis that tests the effect of external 
factors in regard to the coalition membership of material and purposive groups. 
H: If there is a significant change in the external subsystem events then this will have 
a stronger effect on increasing the size of material advocacy coalitions than purposive 
advocacy coalitions. 
This hypothesis builds on existing ACF knowledge. It tests the assumption that 
purposive groups have more general commitments and thus their beliefs, which is 
characterised as the ‘glue’ of an advocacy coalition, can stick more easily to several policy 
subsystems. Conversely, the more specific interests, profit, of material groups means that 
their involvement is dependent on the profit effects caused by external events and the 
spillovers which directly contribute towards their involvement in advocacy coalitions. 
Through an analysis of consultation minutes, working groups, party manifestos, 
and interviews, the next section identifies the major actors for the 2003 and 2009 
Directives. Furthermore, patterns of ‘nontrivial coordination’ are identified through joint 
press-releases and the information supplied through interviews. This approach forms the 
basis in answering the research question’s desire to identify the relevant Advocacy 
Coalitions. Additional documents have been sourced from the Council and the 
Commission through the ‘Access to Documents’ scheme. Finally, and of particular note, 
the personal documents of Rapporteur Avril Doyle for Directive 2009/29/EC were sourced 
from the European Parliament’s Historical Archives in Luxembourg. These documents 
offer a unique primary account into actions of the advocacy coalitions towards the ETS.  
 
2. Environmental David vs. Industrial Goliath 
The actors involved in respect to the 2003 and 2009 Directive are mapped in Table 
1 and Table 2. These tables group actors according to their category (Member State, EU 
Institution, or NGO) and their policy core beliefs which are defined according to their views 
on the “proper balance between government and market” 30. In this sense, actors in ‘green’ 
represent those that are presumed to favour more environmental protection from the 
government, while ‘red’ represents those that favour less regulation and the functioning of 
the market. ‘Orange’ represents unknown or undetermined preferences. For the Council, 
the characterisation of the Member States is sourced from the ‘Manifesto Project 
Database’, which analyses Party Manifestos across the EU Member States. The variable 
                                                 
30
 Cairney, ‘Policy Concepts’, op. cit., p. 2. 
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utilised is the percentage of the ruling party’s respective manifestos that is dedicated to 
referencing ‘Environmental Protection’31. If this share is higher than 4 percent, then the 
Member State is coloured green, if not it is coloured ‘red’, and where data is unavailable it 
is ‘orange’. While, a variable for ‘Free Market Economy’32 is also available, this is 
deceptively low within the Manifesto Database and thus taints the research merit of its 
application. Interestingly, the Member States that this approach identifies broadly 
correspond to what interviewees also acknowledged. This approach is applied to all 
Member States and their colour is based on the party that was in power during the final 
vote in the Council during each legislative process (July 2003 and April 2009 respectively). 
The identification in the European Parliament (EP) and Commission follows an 
institutional logic whereby DG environment (DG ENV) is Green, while DG Enterprise (DG 
ENTR) is coloured red. Similarly, the Committees within the European Parliament that 
handled the dossier are coloured based on their institutional logic. However, the 2003 EP 
Committee for Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy is coloured green as its 
shadow-rapporteur, Mr. Newton Dunn, revealed that he “had personally decided that it was 
important and must try and save the planet, literally”33. This perception may be influenced 
by his science-based degree in Physics and Chemistry which meant he “maybe paid more 
attention [to Climate Change]”34. This quotation also reveals the importance individual 
actors can play within the wider framework of an Advocacy Coalition. Finally, the NGOs 
during the 2003 Directive are identified from the initial 2001 Commission consultation 
procedure35.  
  
                                                 
31
 Manifesto Project Database, Coding Scheme: CMP, retrieved 17 April 2015, 
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/coding_schemes/1 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Interview with Newton Dunn, op. cit. 
34
 Interview with Newton Dunn, op. cit. 
35
 European Commission, Chairman’s Summary Record of Stakeholder Consultation Meeting (with Industry 
and Environmental NGOs) of 4 September 2001, Brussels, 17 September 2001  
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Table 1: Actors around ETS Directive 2003 
 
 
Environment 
Orientated  
Undetermined 
 
Market Orientated 
Member 
States 
Austria, Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden 
 
Denmark 
 
Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, UK 
EU 
Institutions 
EP: ENVI, EP : 
ITRE 
COM: DG ENV 
 
EP: ECON, EP: 
JURI  
COM: DG ENTR 
NGOs 
Enterprises pour 
l’environment, 
WBCSD, European 
Business Council for 
a Sustainable Energy 
Future, WWF, 
CO2e.com, Climate 
Network Europe, 
Foundation for 
International 
Environmental Law 
(FIELD) 
 
Vertretung Hessen, 
UK Emissions 
Trading Group, 
German Emissions 
Trading Group, 
Netherlands’ 
National CO2 
Emission trading 
Committee 
 
COGEN EUROPE, 
IFIEC, EUROMETAUX, 
EEA, European 
Federation of Glass 
Industries, CEFIC, 
AFEP-AGREF, 
EUROCHAMBRES, 
EUROFER, 
Confederation of 
European Paper 
Industries, 
CEMBUREAU, 
European Lime 
Association, ERT, 
EURELECTRIC, 
CESCO, UNICE, 
EUROPIA, International 
Association of Oil and 
Gas Producers, European 
Independent Steel Works 
Associations, Euroheat & 
Power, Ener-G8.  
Total 17 
 
7 
 
29 
Sources: Author’s Elaboration 
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Table 2: Actors around ETS Directive 2009 
 
 
Environment 
Orientated  
Undetermined 
 
Market Orientated 
Member 
States 
Austria, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, 
France, 
Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Romania, 
Spain, Sweden 
 
Cyprus, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta 
 
Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, UK 
EU 
Institutions 
EP: ENVI, 
COM: DG ENV   
EP: ECON, EP: 
REGI, EP: ITRE  
EP: INTA 
COM: DG ENTR 
NGOs 
CAN-Europe, WWF, 
Carbon Trading 
Sector, UK 
Environment 
Agency, ECN, IEA, 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Ireland, FIELD, 
DEFRA UK, US 
Environmental 
Protection Agency, 
UNEP Risoe Centre, 
Centre for Clear Air 
Policy, Greenpeace, 
Climate Neutral 
Group, Carbon 
Trading Sector 
 
CEPS, Ecofys, 
PWC, Emission 
Authority the 
Netherlands, Öko-
Institut, Mckinsey 
& Company, 
PointCarbon, 
Margaree 
Consultants, Pew 
Centre, ECX 
 
EFMA, CEFIC, EAA, 
Eurocoal, 
BUSINESSEUROPE, 
Vattendall, Statoil, Royal 
Cosun, Tracetebel 
Engineering, IETA, 
German Emissions 
Trading Authority, 
Energy Market Authority 
Finland, ECIS, 
EURELECTRIC, 
Deutsche-Bank, IFIEC 
Europe, EuroChlor, 
NERA, European Lime 
Association, 
CEMBUREAU, CEPI, 
CPIV, CERAMIE-UNIE, 
EUROMETAUX, ETUC, 
Eurofer, Alliance of 
Energy Intensive 
Industries, New Carbon 
Finance 
Total 26 
 
18 
 
43 
Source: Author’s Elaboration 
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Similarly, the NGOs during the 2009 Directive are identified from the minutes of the 1st36, 
2nd37, 3rd38, and 4th39 ECCP working groups that were held throughout 2007 and served 
“as a major input to the legislative work of the Commission”40. 
Comparing Table 1 and Table 2, it is clear that the number of actors increased 
between 2003 and 2009:  the 53 actors in 2003 increased to 87 by 2009. It is important to 
note the effects of the 2004 enlargement in strengthening the market orientation of the 
Council of the European Union, a so-called “East-West dimension had become manifest in 
the [2008] ETS reform process”41. Furthermore, the Market Orientated grouping 
outmatches the Environmental grouping during both Directives. However, Dreger contends 
that “ENGOs countered the input of business interests well” in 200342. The number of 
‘undetermined’ actors in 2009 can be partly explained by the fact that the 2007 ECCP 
Working Groups were by invitation, meaning the Commission invited balanced opinions 
from consultancy companies and non-aligned bodies.  While Table 1 and Table 2 provide 
insights into the distribution of actors and their policy core beliefs, namely an economy-
first or environment-first distinction, it does not necessarily answer the research question 
in identifying the Advocacy Coalitions. It is therefore noted that Advocacy Coalitions 
“share similar policy core beliefs and engage in nontrivial degrees of coordination”43. This 
paper shall identify such advocacy coalitions, and their development, through an analysis 
of actors showing ‘nontrivial degrees of coordination’. This is operationalised with joint 
press-releases, the information given in interviews, and the unpublished documents of the 
EU institutions and Rapporteur Doyle. 
  
                                                 
36
 European Commission, Final Report of the 1st Meeting of the ECCP Working Group on Emissions Trading 
on the Review of the ETS on The Scope of the Directive’, Brussels, 8-9 March 2007 
37
 European Commission, Final Report of the 2nd Meeting of the ECCP Working Group on Emissions Trading 
on the Review of the ETS on Robust Compliance and Enforcement, Brussels, 26-27 April 2007 
38
 European Commission, Final Report of the 3rd Meeting of the ECCP Working Group on Emissions Trading 
on the Review of the ETS on Further Harmonisation and Increased Predictability, Brussels, 21-22 
May 2007. 
39
 European Commission, Final Report of the 4th Meeting of the ECCP Working Group on Emissions Trading 
on the Review of the ETS on Linking with Emissions Trading Schemes of Third Countries, Brussels, 
14-15 June 2007. 
40
 European Commission, 1st Meeting of the ECCP, op. cit., p. 2. 
41
 J. B. Skjaerseth and J. Wettestad, ‘The EU Emissions Trading System Revised (Directive 2009/29/EC)’, in S. 
Oberthur and M. Pallemaerts (eds.), The New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal 
Legislation and Climate Diplomacy, VUB press, 2010, p. 74. 
42
 J. Dreger, ‘The Influence of Environmental NGOs on the Design of the Emissions Trading Scheme of the 
EU: An Application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework’, Bruges Political Research Papers, No. 8, 
September 2008, p. 27. 
43
 Weible et al., ‘Guide to the ACF’, op. cit., p. 128. 
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Environment-first Advocacy Coalition and Development 
Turning to the environment-first group, which share the same policy core beliefs, 
research revealed that CAN-Europe initially issued position papers by itself, as seen with 
the ‘Emissions Trading in the EU’ position paper issued on the 05 October 200044. This 
trend continues after the September 2001 Stakeholder Consultation Meeting organised by 
the Commission, as in December 2001 CAN-Europe issued another individual position 
paper45. The first joint position paper among the environment-first grouping emerges in 
February 2002 as CAN-Europe, Birdlife International, Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), 
and WWF issued an ‘Open Letter to EU Ministers on the Proposal for Domestic Trading of 
GHG Allowances’46. Furthermore, this emerging Advocacy Coalition can be seen as CAN-
Europe’s individual position papers reference that “NGOs are generally sceptical of cap 
and trade system”47. This shows they have been discussing a common position and thus 
coordinating opinions. A joint press-release to the European Parliament prior to their first 
plenary vote was issued by CAN-Europe, Birdlife International, and the WWF48. Once 
Directive 2003 was adopted, CAN-Europe, WWF, Greenpeace, Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds (RSPB), and FoEE issued a joint statement welcoming its adoption by 
Parliament49. However, “Friends of the earth signed on to some of the policy briefings but 
they were less engaged”50. Indeed, a Commission official noted that Friends of the Earth 
were, and still are, “the most negative on emissions trading out of the NGOs”51. 
Accordingly, it can be surmised that CAN-Europe and WWF formed the basis of this initial 
ENGO advocacy coalition. 
Moving forward, Mr. Wyns, formerly of CAN-Europe, revealed that while CAN-
Europe represented “130 something other members”, they managed a “small working 
group” which “would formulate core elements of a position [on ETS] and then get approved 
by all the members”52. This working group contained a representative from CAN-Europe, 
                                                 
44
 CAN-Europe, ‘Emissions Trading in the EU’, Position Paper, 05 October 2000. 
45
 CAN-Europe, ‘Emission Trading in the EU: Let’s See Some Targets!’, Position Paper, 20 December 2001. 
46
 CAN-Europe, ‘It is Time to Implement Kyoto at Home’, Open Letter, 25 February 2005. 
47
 CAN-Europe, ‘No Credible Climate Policy Without STRONG RULES’, Position Paper, 25 September 2002. 
48
 CAN-Europe, ‘Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Directive: Use Your Vote for an Effective System – The 
EU’s Kyoto Commitment Depends on it’, 09 October 2002. 
49
 CAN-Europe, ‘Emissions Trading Directive a Significant Step Forward, say NGOs’, Joint Statement, 02 July 
2003. 
50
 Interview with Mr. Joris den Blanken, EU Climate Policy Director, Greenpeace, Brussels, 14 April 2015 
51
 Interview with a European Commission Official, Brussels, 28 April 2015. 
52
 Interview with Mr. Tomas Wyns, member of the Belgian government delegation during the 2003 ETS 
negotiations and former Policy Officer at CAN-Europe, Brussels, 21 April 2015. 
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WWF, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth53. Analysis shows that Greenpeace was 
actively incorporated into this advocacy coalition from around 2006 when they issued a 
joint press release with CAN-Europe and WWF, which even referenced a joint study 
previously completed just by the WWF and CAN-Europe54. Additionally, the personal 
unpublished documents of Rapporteur Doyle show that she received an email on 29 
August 2008 from CAN-Europe which discussed how the “European NGOs have analysed 
the amendments” and further presented their assessment55. This NGO Briefing contains 
the logos of CAN-Europe, WWF, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and Oxfam56. 
Interestingly, WWF also sent emails to Rapporteur Doyle which carbon copied (cc’d) CAN-
Europe, FoEE, and Greenpeace into the exchange57. Finally, emails sent from Jules 
Kortenhorst of European Climate Foundation (ECF) included a WWF position statement58. 
The other ENGOs were not cc’d into the correspondence and the ECF later tried to 
introduce Ms. Doyle to “a close advisor to President Sarkozy on matters relating to climate 
change”59. However, an ENGO representative commented that the ECF was very fresh 
within the ETS debate and funded certain ENGOs which “enabled them to function at that 
time”60. Nonetheless, coordination with the ECF was not occurring61.  
Within the Parliament and the Commission, it can be assumed that the 
Parliamentary Committee ENVI and the DG ENV formed part of the advocacy coalition. As 
did DG ITRE in 2003 as revealed by Mr. Newton Dunn, although its leanings in 2008 are 
indeterminate. However, while the Council had environment-orientated Member States, an 
interview with Joris den Blanken, the EU Climate Policy Director at Greenpeace, revealed 
that the interests of “industry were generally stronger in the Council”62. In 2008, 
documents show that Denmark was against free allocation63, while Finland wanted to 
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extend the same allocation rules to heat production by CHP64. While the ENGOs did not 
have coordinated activity in this institution, it is apparent that certain Member States were 
pro-environment. Accordingly, the core of the environment-first Advocacy Coalition was 
initially based around CAN-Europe, WWF, and later involved Greenpeace. This advocacy 
coalition was recognised by Pieter de Pous, the EU  
Figure 1: Key Actors in the Environment-first Advocacy Coalition 
Source: Author’s Elaboration 
 
Policy Director at the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), who commented 
that “EEB’s not been a very active player in the ETS debate, best you ask at CAN, WWF, or  
GP”65. FoEE, Oxfam, and the ECF were operating in a more peripheral role, while support 
was also forthcoming from the relevant DGs and Committees. The central and peripheral 
actors in the environment-first advocacy coalition are shown in Figure 1. It can be 
assumed that other actors who shared the same policy-core beliefs, as shown in Table 1 
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and 2, but that did not engage in ‘nontrivial coordination’ can be attributed as having a 
supportive role. 
Economy-first Advocacy Coalition and Development 
When looking at the economy-first advocacy coalition that covers the market 
leaning actors, it is apparent that BUSINESSEUROPE, formerly UNICE, was at the centre of 
the debate from the outset. On 02 April 1998, UNICE issued an individual position paper on 
the ‘Principles for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading’66. This was in the aftermath of the 
Kyoto Agreement, and before many ENGOs or even CEMBUREAU, the European cement 
association, moved on the issue. Indeed, CEMBUREAU merely includes a periphery 
mention of the Green Paper on emissions trading in their 2000 Activity Report67.  While 
BUSINESSEUROPE continued to issue individual position papers throughout 2001, the 
emergence of a coalition within the cement and steel industries, which were “the most 
eager proponents of voluntary agreements”68, can be seen. In 2002, CEMBUREAU was 
active in a “newly formed alliance of energy intensive industries [AEII] (together with lime, 
glass, pulp and paper, non-ferrous metals and steel industries”69. An Advocacy Coalition 
was emerging between CEFIC, EUROFER, CEMBUREAU, EUROMETAUX, CEPI, EUROPIA, 
and EURELECTRIC, the organisations composing the AEII. A member of the AEII revealed 
that “meetings, calls and emails [were] exchanged”70. Interestingly, UNICE supported the 
AEII’s statements, as their position paper of 15 October 2002 “firmly supports the joint 
statement”71 of the AEII. 
A seemingly key development in the economy-first advocacy coalition occurred in 
2005 when BUSINESSEUROPE established the Alliance for a Competitive European 
Industry (ACEI). Strikingly, this included most of the members previously outlined in the 
AEII72. Joris den Blanken of Greenpeace commented that the AEII was “a group related to 
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BUSINESSEUROPE”73. However, a representative from a Business Association commented 
that BUSINESSEUROPE didn’t really work with AIEE in coordinating a common 
understanding, 74 and a European Industry Association contended that the ACEI “is more 
generally focused on European industry competitiveness [and] it also has a slightly 
different scope in terms of sectors represented”75. Accordingly, this merger seemed to 
primarily be symbolic, as it didn’t contribute to ‘nontrivial coordination’ in relation to the 
ETS. However, other industries increased their involvement to the ETS through the AEII, 
and by 2008 the following organisations joined the AEII: EULA, EURO ALLIAGES, Euro 
Chlor, EUROGYPSUM, EXCA, and Glass Alliance Europe76. Thus it is shown that the AEII 
brought many more organisations into the economy-first advocacy coalition. 
BUSINESSEUROPE operated as peripheral core actor within the economy-first advocacy 
coalition, while CEMBUREAU played a significant role as defined within the AEII. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the AEII is registered at CEMBUREAU's head office77. 
The unpublished documents of Rapporteur Doyle highlight the numerous 
industries involved in the ETS debate. The level of coordination throughout the 
documented emails is not as clear-cut as with the environment-first coalition. The 
economic actors do not cc other organisations into their emails, which may be due to the 
sectorial interests at play within the economy-first coalition. In this respect, Rapporteur 
Doyle archived these correspondences according to industries such as Steel78, Chemical79, 
and Cement/Gypsum80. While the European organisations frequently lobbied their 
amendments and justifications, it is also interesting to note that individual companies 
voiced their concerns. In this respect, the firm CRH Europe Materials, which is based in 
Dublin, emailed Rapporteur Doyle “the position of the cement industry in Ireland”81. This 
contained a joint memorandum from the Cement Manufacturers Ireland and CEMBUREAU 
and may have been designed as a personal touch, given that Mrs. Doyle was an Irish 
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MEP82. While it is difficult to ascertain if this was a more effective means, it contributes to 
the characterisation of the ETS as a field of Multi-Level Governance where national and 
supranational bodies interact. A European Industry Association commented that while the 
“AEII has not been fragmented, it always developed a common position whilst respecting 
each sectors’ specificities”83. Accordingly, the personal documents of Rapporteur Doyle 
reveal these ‘specificities’ and showcase that while a common position within the AEII 
may have been reached, various European organisations and firms still acted 
independently. 
Turning to the EU institutions, it is assumed that the Commission’s DG ENTR 
would favour the economy-first advocacy coalition while the same logic applies to the EP’s 
committee of INTA in 2009; conversely the position of ITRE is unknown. Interestingly, MEP 
Karl Heinz Florenz (EPP) can be accredited to the economy-first coalition, as he was 
“leading the pack [in the EP] in accommodating some of the concerns from industry 
concerning emission allowances”84. Furthermore, the personal documents of Rapporteur 
Doyle show emails from EUROFER in which a Mr. Axel Eggert tries to distance their 
organisation from the belief that “Karl-Heinz Florenz would have taken the EUROFER 
position”85. These emails are corroborated by Mrs. Doyle’s handwritten notes, exclaiming: 
“Axel, former EP assistant to Karl Heinz Florenz!”86. Regarding Member States, no clear 
indicators for ‘nontrivial coordination’ with the economy-first advocacy coalition can be 
established. However, an interviewee identified that the Netherlands was strongly 
influenced by the steel industry87. Similarly, it is widely reported that Poland was 
concerned that measures within the 2009 ETS would “threaten the economic viability of 
the many coal-fired power stations in these countries”88. Unpublished documents retrieved 
from the Council of the European Union reveal that the Czech Republic’s amendments, in 
2008, centred on achieving “Free allocation for electricity production”89, which contrasts 
with the position of Denmark outlined earlier. Furthermore, Italy’s amendments focused on 
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removing specific percentages, as this was deemed unsatisfactory “as long as the 
proposal does not specify for the sector and sub-sector exposed”90.  
Once again, while coordination could not be identified with the Member States, 
sympathetic participants may be identified. The central and peripheral actors within the 
economy-first coalition are shown in Figure 2. As was assumed for the environment-first 
coalition, those actors that shared the same policy-core beliefs, detailed in Table 1 and 2, 
but that did not engage in ‘nontrivial coordination’ are determined to have a supporting 
role.  
In summation, research has highlighted that both the environment-first and 
economy-first advocacy coalitions that developed between 2003 and 2009 did not include 
all of the actors that were involved around the respective Directives (as identified in Table 
1 and Table 2). The environment-first coalition expanded to include Greenpeace within its 
core body, while the economy-first coalition brought in several sectors including alloys, 
ceramics, chemicals, chlor alkali, and expanded clay industries. Furthermore, this coalition 
was  
Figure 2: Key Actors in the Economy-first Advocacy Coalition 
Source: Author’s Elaboration 
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consolidated under the framework of the AEII. Remarkably, one cannot find a strong 
indicator for ‘nontrivial coordination’ by the Foundation for International Environmental 
Law (FIELD) and thus contrasts with Dreger, who identifies them to be one of “the most 
influential ENGOs”91. Having identified the advocacy coalitions, this paper will now place 
these coalitions within the more consistent external events of the ACF, namely the 
‘Relatively Stable Parameters’.  
 
3. Relatively Stable Parameters 
The ‘Relatively Stable Parameters’ identified under the ACF are: the basic 
attributes of the problem area and distribution of natural resources; the fundamental 
sociocultural values and social structure; and the basic constitutional structure. They 
locate the ETS policy subsystem within its field of Climate Change. 
 
Basic Attributed of the Problem Are and Distribution of Natural Resources (Externality and 
Steel) 
Sabatier comments that identifying the basic attributes of the problem area has 
been influenced by Public Choice theorists92. GHG emissions, which lead to climate 
change, are recognised as an “externality”93. This means the issue of climate change 
transcends international boundaries and is suitable to government intervention. 
Additionally, the basic attributes of this problem is informed by scientific learning, as seen 
by the publications of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). The reports of the IPCC move towards “understanding the scientific basis of risk of 
human-induced climate change”94. The ACF dictates that this would make the field 
susceptible to policy change95. Turning to the natural resources, Graph 1 shows steel 
production within Europe, an extension of iron ore deposit locations. Sabatier ascertains 
that such resources “strongly affects a society’s overall wealth and viability of different 
economic sectors”96. However, given that approximately 70% of the Euro area’s GDP exists 
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in ‘Services’97,  this aspect of the ACF requires updating so as to better fit the EU. 
Nonetheless, the characterisation of steel may be of benefit regarding ETS parameters, as 
the Directives affected “the production and processing of ferrous metals”98. 
Source: European Commission, ‘Study on the Competitiveness of the European Steel 
Sector’, Final Report, p. 11, retrieved 22 April 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/metals-minerals/files/final_report_steel_en.pdf 
 
Fundamental Socio-Cultural Values and Social Structure (Environment) 
Environment features strongly in the socio-cultural values of the European Union. 
This can be seen with the 1999 Eurobarometer survey where 69.1% of respondents 
identified environmental protection and the fight against pollution as “an immediate and 
urgent problem”99. An interview conducted with Bill Newton Dunn, MEP since 1979 and 
shadow-rapporteur for the Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy Committee 
during the 2003 ETS Directive, revealed how “the mood was less clear whether climate 
change was really happening, but it was good to take steps now”100. This highlights how 
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the consistent socio-cultural values and social structure within the European Union 
encouraged action upon climate change. This analysis lends credence to the ACF 
assertion that “while such norms are not immutable, change usually requires decades”101.  
 
Basic Constitutional Structure (Co-Decision and Multi-level Governance) 
For Cairney, the ACF’s assessment of the ‘basic constitutional structure’ suggests 
that it “provides a source of stability within sub-systems”102. Importantly, the EU’s basic 
constitutional structure was consistent throughout this paper’s research period and was 
based upon the 2001 Treaty of Nice. Furthermore, both Directives 2003 and 2009 were 
based on the ‘rules’ outlined in Article 251 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Communities, namely the co-decision procedure.  
Having placed the ETS policy subsystem within its Relatively Stable Parameters,  
attention now turns to the new hypothesis that tests the effect of external factors in 
regard to the coalition membership of material and purposive groups 
 
4. Impact of External System Events 
The External System Events identified by the ACF include: Changes in Socio-
Economic Conditions, Changes in Public Opinion, Changes in Systemic Governing 
Coalition, and Changes in Other Policy Subsystems. This section examines each their 
respective relationship to the hypothesis,  
H: If there is a significant change in the external subsystem events then this will have a 
stronger effect on increasing the size of material advocacy coalitions than purposive advocacy 
coalitions. 
 
Changes in Socio-Economic Conditions (Prices and Crisis) 
Changes in socioeconomic conditions can act in “undermining the causal 
assumptions of present policies or by significantly altering the political support of various 
advocacy coalitions”103. This paper discusses the effect of the ETS on electricity prices 
and the effect it had on advocacy coalitions. Furthermore, the financial crisis is identified 
as a dominant factor that widely affected socioeconomic conditions. 
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In its impact assessment of Directive 2003 the Commission recognised the 
“indirect effect accruing from rising electricity prices”104. In this respect, members of the 
economy-first coalition seem to have actively framed this external event, as in 2003 they 
denounced the “unintended and unjustified impact of the Emissions Trading Directive on 
electricity prices”105.  Furthermore, the contact with DG ENTR had a “special emphasis on 
electricity prices”106. Accordingly, this event is characterised as a ‘significant change’, as it 
was brought into the policy subsystem by the economy-first coalition that operated in line 
with the ACF assumption that “external events provide new resources to some coalitions 
– it is up to them to exploit the opportunity”107. By 2007, electricity prices were established 
as a key issue on the agenda; during the 3rd meeting of the ECCP Working Group, several 
business organisations made presentations on “the Impact of the EU ETS on Electricity 
prices”108.  
Conversely, the environment-first coalition did not enter the fray on the issue of 
electricity prices. CAN-Europe did not produce any press releases on the issue, nor did 
WWF discuss electricity prices during Agenda Item 4: ‘Carbon Price signals, allocation 
methodologies, and international aspects including electricity prices’ during the 3rd ECCP 
Meeting109. This indirect effect seems to have mobilised an expansion within the AEEI, as 
2005 documents show that “work on electricity prices and the functioning of the electricity 
market was continued in close cooperation with IFIEC”110. This effect can lend credence to 
the hypothesis that a ‘significant change’ in an external event will increase the size of 
material groups to a greater extent that purposive groups. The correlation exhibited may 
be particularly prominent, given that electricity prices affected the material profit of such 
groups. 
Turning to the financial crisis, research revealed that 2008/2009 was simply too 
early to have an impact on the advocacy coalitions111. Mr. Wyns of CAN-Europe 
                                                 
104
 European Commission, ‘Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extent the EU greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme: 
Impact Assessment’, Commission Staff Working Document, p. 43, retrieved 5 March 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/docs/sec_2008_52_en.pdf 
105
CEMBUREAU, Annual Report 2003. 2003, p. 9, retrieved 09 April 2015, 
http://www.cembureau.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Annual_Report_2003.pdf 
106
 Ibid, p. 11. 
107
 Cairney, ‘Policy Concepts’, op. cit., p. 4. 
108
 European Commission, 3rd Meeting of the ECCP, op. cit., p. 10. 
109
 Ibid. 
110
 CEMBUREAU, Annual Report 2005. 2005, p. 10, retrieved 09 April 2015, 
http://www.cembureau.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Annual_Report_2000.pdf 
111
 Interview with den Blanken, op. cit. 
30 
 
commented that the 2008 negotiations centred on the principal that “we are going to grow 
[economically]”112. This sentiment was mirrored by a European Industry Association, who 
ascertained that the system was designed with growth in mind and that “no one was pre-
empting where we are now”113. Given this situation, the effects of the financial crisis upon 
the advocacy coalitions within this paper’s timeframe is indeterminate. However, analysis 
shows that the economy-first coalition began to advocate that the Commission should 
“not add extra burden that might break the industry’s back”114. The emerging effects of 
this external event can also be seen by Greenpeace’s representative, who commented how 
the position of the Rapporteur Avril Doyle for the 2009 Directive was “very much 
restrained”, due to the ambition of the EU to be prepared ahead of the Copenhagen climate 
summit and also the unfolding financial crisis, which meant she could not afford to 
strongly oppose the French EU Presidency proposals115. Further research with an 
expanded timeframe is required to fully understand how the financial crisis impacted the 
advocacy coalitions within the ETS policy subsystem. However, the financial crisis was 
not a factor in affecting the membership of the advocacy coalitions between the 2003 and 
2009 ETS Directives. 
 
Changes in Public Opinion (Eurobarometer) 
This paper analyses the Eurobarometer question, ‘What do you think are the two 
most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?. Graph 2 situates this 
question in respect to the relative percentage of respondents that answered the ‘Economic 
Situation’, ‘Protecting the Environment’, or ‘Don’t Know’. Strikingly, while environmental 
concerns generally feature quite strongly in the public opinion of the EU, Graph 2 
highlights that EU citizens still view the economic situation as being of greater concern. 
The figures show that while the ‘economic situation’ is more prioritised, it also has greater 
fluctuations.  Furthermore, the preference attributed to the ‘economic situation’ was 
declining from 2003 to 2007, the period within which the ETS was introduced and revised. 
This was complemented by a general trending increase in the priority to ‘protect the 
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environment’. It was only after the 2009 Directive that “competitiveness has really become 
a priority and the question today is how we can learn from the past”116.  
The lack of a ‘significant change’ corresponds to the hypothesised assumption 
that ‘public opinion’ had not influenced the memberships within the ETS policy subsystem 
between Directive 2003 and 2009. Mr. Newton Dunn, a former MEP, shadow-rapporteur for 
the ITRE committee during the initial 2003 Directive, and member of the ENVI Committee 
in 2008, revealed that while the issue of climate change was “more important in 2008 than 
early 2001”, he had decided in 2003 that “this was important and we must try to save the 
planet,  literally”117. Thus, while a slight increase in environmental concerns between the 
Directives is seen, no ‘significant change’ is apparent. Regarding the environment-first 
coalition, Mr. den Blanken of Greenpeace commented that public opinion did not bring 
about Greenpeace’s involvement in the ETS debate but that it was “a policy choice, just a 
strategic policy choice”118. This may lend credence to the hypothesis that changes in 
external factors do not implicitly affect purposive groups. Additionally, according to one 
interviewee,  
“Everyone thinks we should reduce emissions and save the planet, and everyone 
has the belief that industry should reduce. No one understands that industry is just 
a very small part. The ETS is 50% of emissions, and industry makes up only half of 
that. The bigger part is building, transport and electricity. Industry has already 
reached their limit in emissions reduction”119.  
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Graph 2 What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?, Eurobarometer, 2003-2010 
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Public opinion may in fact be misinterpreting the dynamics of the ETS debate. Accordingly, 
a strong realignment in this perception would shift the focus on new industries and thus 
may bring more organisations into the economy-first advocacy coalition. Once again, the 
shift in public opinion towards the economic crisis may provide worthy analysis for 
research that extends beyond 2009. However, the lack of a ‘significant change’ contributes 
to the hypothesis that public opinion was unable to impact the advocacy coalitions. If a 
‘significant change’ were present, it would be methodologically difficult to account for the 
degree to which this change in public opinion is independent and external to an advocacy 
coalition. The link between public opinion and advocacy coalitions is not unidirectional, 
and is more complex than a simple action reaction characterisation, as seen by the UN 
Secretary General in 2007 telling Greenpeace to “mobilize public opinion” concerning 
climate change120.  
 
Changes in Systemic Governing Coalitions (Transitions and Elections) 
The ACF dictates that a change in a systemic governing coalition can represent 
“the election of a new government with beliefs that favour one coalition over another”121 
Thus there exists an almost paradoxical nature regarding the effect of a change in a 
systemic governing coalition within the ACF. Due to the multilevel characterisations of the 
EU, a change in a systemic governing coalition can emerge from within the Member States 
of the Council, the Commission, or the European Parliament. Each shall be dealt with in 
sequence. 
There were no dramatic national elections that affected the ETS debate between 
the Directives122. However, the Council experienced an enlargement in 2004 in which the 
majority of these nations favoured a market orientated approach. Nevertheless, a 
significant degree of ‘non-trivial coordination’ could not be identified. Importantly, while 
the Member States themselves weren’t folded into advocacy coalitions, this expansion 
increased the economy-first coalition as it attracted national organisations into their 
representative associations. In this respect, the dominant nation represented in 
EURACOAL became Poland, with six national organisations123. Conversely, the effect on 
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the purposive environment-first grouping was less pronounced, as seen by the 
organisations within CAN-Europe. No organisation joined from Cyprus, Estonia, or 
Slovakia, two joined from the Czech Republic, while a single organisation joined from each 
of the other new Member States124. This contrasts with the six organisations from the 
Netherlands, seven from Belgium, twenty from Germany, and twenty-five from the United 
Kingdom125.  
Evidently, enlargement strengthened certain economy-first members to a greater 
extent than it did the environment-first members, consistent with this paper’s hypothesis. 
Moving to the Commission, the change in governance between Prodi (1999-2004), Barroso 
I (2004-2009), and Barroso II (2009-2014) did not represent a significant external system 
change to the ETS subsystem.. Firstly, Article 17 of the Treaty of the European Union 
clearly states that “the Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and 
take appropriate initiatives to that end”126, thus it is less susceptible to the partisan 
politics that may dominate national executives. Secondly, interviewees noted that the 
relevant “DGs were indeed very settled”127, and that “since 2003, it’s kind of business as 
usual”128. Additionally, there have only been five Secretaries-General of the Commission 
thus ensuring a high level of consistency in the “preparation of the institution’s work”129. It 
is clear that the Commission’s leadership transition did not represent a significant change 
in governing coalition and correspondingly an effect upon the advocacy coalition’s 
memberships, or indeed resources, is not evident. 
The European Parliament's election in 2004 fits within the research boundaries of 
the two ETS Directives. Graphs 4 and 5 show the incoming party composition of the 
European Parliament for the elections of 1999 and 2004130. These figures reveal that the 
Group of the European People’s Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED) and the Group of 
the Party of European Socialists (PES) constituted a majority in the Parliament on both 
occasions and the Simple Majority required to pass legislation under the co-decision 
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Graph 3: Composition of MEPs in Incoming Parliament's Fifth Legislature (1999-2004) 
procedure. Mr. Newton Dunn MEP summarised the situation in that the Parliament was “a 
very green group”131.  
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Source: Elaborated on the basis of European Parliament, ‘Composition of Parliament’, 
retrieved 05 April 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/divers/composition_EP/elections2009_composition-
parliament_en.pdf 
 
Changes in Other Policy Subsystems (International and European levels) 
Sabatier declares that “subsystems are only partially autonomous” and further 
adds that “decisions and impacts from other policy sectors are one of the principal 
dynamic elements affecting specific subsystems”132. Accordingly, as the ETS was 
frequently characterised as a “learning-by-doing’133 approach, this paper shall analyse the 
possible impact of other policy sectors through the perspective of the international 
dimension, and then briefly through the European dimension.  
The initial establishment of the EU’s ETS was facilitated by the international 
policy sector and the “unexpected policy window created by Kyoto”134. In particular, the 
departure of America from the international sector was influential as a Commission 
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official succinctly summated that “Bush walked out and then Europe held it together”135. 
Thus, this initial international event motivated the advocacy-coalitions to combine and 
express their beliefs. The key international policy decisions regarding the ETS and the 
Kyoto protocol emerged from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). Between the publication of the EU’s ETS Directives in 2003 and 2009, 
there have been eleven UNFCCC meetings. Of particular interest are those sessions which 
contained a Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMP).  This entails the annual meetings which occurred at Montreal in 2005, 
Nairobi in 2006, Bali in 2007, and Poznan in 2008136. The major output from these 
conferences occurred with the adoption of the so-called ‘Bali-Roadmap’ in 2007. 
The ‘Bali-Roadmap’ was designed to “guide negotiations over the next two 
years”137. The output from this conference cemented “a negotiating framework in place” 
and included “developed and developing countries in the negotiations on ‘considerations’ 
for a final agreement”138. Importantly, the emission reductions communicated by countries 
were mere “pledges, as are the financial promises”139, thus it was not as binding as the 
Kyoto outcome and certainly wasn’t credible as a significant change.  The key focus was 
on the “developing country Commitments”140, which “resulted in a lower level of ambition, 
particularly for the developed countries”141. However, while the policy impact on the EU 
wasn’t strong, the US’s objections almost caused a breakdown in the negotiations142. 
Accordingly, the developments of the Bali Roadmap further consolidated the EU as a 
‘green leader’. However, it is unclear whether developments within the UNFCC served to 
mobilise the advocacy coalitions to such an extent as occurred with the Kyoto Protocol, as 
interviewees could not identify an effect to any degree of confidence143. This can partly be 
attributed to the fact that the ‘Bali-Roadmap’ was not a ‘significant change’ for the EU. 
                                                 
135
 Interview with a Commission Official, op. cit. 
136
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘Meetings’, retrieved 23 April 2015, 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/6240.php 
137
 S. R. Fletcher and L. Parker, ‘Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol, Bali “Action Plan”, and International 
Actions’, CRS Report for Congress, 2008, p. i. 
138
 Ibid., p. 10. 
139
 X. Ngwadla, A. C. Abeysinghe, and A. Fretias, ‘The 2015 Climate Agreement: Lessons from the Bali Road 
Map’, European Capacity Building Initiative, 2013, p-. 6. 
140
 EcoQuity, ‘Debrief on Bali Roadmap’, December 2007, p. 1, retrieved 30 April 2015, 
http://www.ecoequity.org/docs/Bali-debrief.pdf 
141
 Nagwadla et al., op. cit., p. 9. 
142
 Fletcher et al., op. cit., p. 11. 
143
 Interview with various interviewees. 
38 
 
Another significant event in the international policy sector, the Copenhagen 
Conference, did not directly occur within the timeline bounded by the 2003 and 2009 
Directives. However, documents retrieved from the Council show that Mr Jean-Louis 
Borloo, the French Minister for Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and Town and 
Country Planning, spoke on behalf of the Council and “welcomed the prospect of reaching 
an agreement [on Directive 2009] before the initiation of the Copenhagen round”144. 
Accordingly, it can be determined to be a looming external system event that the ETS 
policy subsystem was aware of. Rapporteur Avril Doyle publicly stated that the 2009 
Directive meant that  
“exceptional circumstances called for exceptional measures. All those involved in 
the EU institutions have clearly understood the need for Europe to drive this 
process forward and deliver it in time for the 15th meeting of the United Nations 
Convention on Climate Change next year in Copenhagen”145.  
 
How did this external event affect the membership of the advocacy coalitions? 
Interestingly, the horizon dominating Copenhagen summit affected the EU institutions 
more than the advocacy coalitions. It shortened the feasible timeline of the policy process 
and may have thus contributed to the widespread surprise that the 2009 Directive “went 
through very smoothly”146, especially considering the centralization of the system. 
CEMBUREAU ascertained that “as the outcome of the COP15 with the Copenhagen Accord 
will not lead to any significant reductions of GHG emissions elsewhere in the world, the 
exposure to international trade has actually become more critical”147, while EUROMETAUX 
deemed that the “Copenhagen failure will accelerate technology drain”148. Thus, the 
economy-first lobbying coalitions tried to utilise the external system event for their own 
gain. Similarly, Greenpeace desired the “EU to increase its domestic climate target” by 
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“strengthening the EU Emissions Trading Scheme”149. This would place the EU “at the 
heart of a coalition to deliver a new internal climate regime”150. Despite these statements, 
the effect upon the advocacy coalitions themselves was less apparent except in limiting 
their lobbying avenues.  
When analysing the effect of other European policy areas, a European Industry 
Association lamented the “kind of silos approach” wherein “the ETS is the ETS and there is 
no link with the contribution of the Energy Intensive Industries to the low carbon 
economy”151. Interviewees could not concretely identify other EU policy areas within which 
either the economy-first or environment-first coalitions had learned. Greenpeace 
commented that they “could have learnt more from REACH [the Regulation on the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals] in terms of industry 
influence”152. A Commission official recognised that “relations have always been much 
better [on the ETS] than when worked on REACH”. However, the European “2020 package 
led to a huge policy overlap”153 and “overlapping targets aren’t effective”154. Agreed in 
2009, these overlaps mean that there is a movement towards the ACF specification that 
“subsystems may overlap with each other (i.e. they interact with each other frequently 
enough so that a subset of actors is part of both”155. This situation can create more 
meaningful impacts from other policy subsystems.  
In summation, the advocacy-coalitions did not experience sufficiently impactful 
policy learning from other EU policy areas; indeed, Mr. Wyns commented upon how the 
“ETS was something completely new”156. Accordingly, the hypothesis relating a significant 
change in external events to an effect on the lobbying coalitions is not apparent within the 
European policy sphere. 
. 
Conclusion: General Findings 
This paper has applied the ACF to study the policy subsystem of the ETS. The important 
contribution of this research lies in identifying the emergence and development of 
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lobbying coalitions and testing a new hypothesis on the effect of external system events 
upon these respective coalitions.  
In relation to its core research question regarding the presence of advocacy 
coalitions, this paper finds that, between the 2003 and 2009 Directive, there were two 
distinct advocacy coalitions active within the ETS policy subsystem, an environment-first 
coalition and an economy-first coalition, respectively. These coalitions emerged in the 
early 2000s, with the economy-first coalition, through the AEII, considerably expanding the 
number of European organisations within its fold. The environment-first coalition had 
much more modest growth as it incorporated Greenpeace into its core body from around 
2006. The unpublished documents of Rapporteur Doyle reveal that the environment-first 
coalition acted more cohesively, as its email correspondences cc’d in other organisations 
and they frequently emailed analyses from other organisations within their coalition. 
Similarly, the “small working group” 157 hosted by CAN-Europe seemed to be more 
cooperative than the ad-hoc “meetings, calls and emails”158 of the AEII. Furthermore, the 
unpublished documents of Rapporteur Doyle revealed that various sectorial industries 
campaigned on their individual interests which was touched upon by an interviewee’s 
assessment that the AEII respected “each sectors’ specificities”159. The ACF proves highly 
useful in being able to identify advocacy coalitions that shared similar policy core beliefs 
and engaged in ‘nontrivial coordination’.  
However, the relative explanatory effects of the proposed hypothesis (If there is a 
significant change in the external subsystem events then this will have a stronger effect 
on increasing the size of material advocacy coalitions than purposive advocacy coalitions) 
are less conclusive. The socioeconomic change in electricity prices and, to a lesser extent, 
the effect from the 2004 enlargement may have affected the development of the material 
lobbying coalitions to a greater degree than their purposive counterpart. However, the 
‘significant change’ in public opinion and the financial crisis fell outside the research 
parameters of this paper, and thus can be identified as areas of research interest for 
additional studies. Furthermore, there was not a ‘significant change’ in the governing 
coalition of the Commission or the “very green group”160 of the European Parliament, while 
the impact of the international policy system affected the lobbying avenues within the 
                                                 
157
 Interview with Wyns, op. cit.  
158
 Interview with a European Industry Association, op. cit. 
159
 Ibid. 
160
 Interview with Newton Dunn, op. cit.. 
41 
 
institutions more than the lobbying coalitions. Accordingly, this paper has limited findings 
regarding the effects of external system events upon advocacy coalitions. An analysis of 
changes in the ACF's external events is affected by the fact that economies have their ups 
and downs, public opinion changes constantly, the relative power of government 
fluctuates, and decisions spill over between sectors on a daily basis161.  
Future revisions of the hypothesis should incorporate instances of “‘abnormal’ 
fluctuations”162. An analysis of this refined hypothesis upon policy subsystems may 
provide more conclusive findings. Thus, while this paper’s hypothesis sees some minor 
success through the effects of electricity prices and the 2004 enlargement, further studies 
with the refined hypothesis are required for a more thorough understanding concerning 
the relationship between external events and advocacy coalitions.  
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Europe is in a constant state of flux. European politics, economics, law and indeed 
European societies are changing rapidly. The European Union itself is in a continuous 
situation of adaptation. New challenges and new requirements arise continually, both 
internally and externally.  
The College of Europe Studies series seeks to publish research on these issues 
done at the College of Europe, both at its Bruges and its Natolin (Warsaw) campus. 
Focused on the European Union and the European integration process, this research may 
be specialised in the areas of political science, law or economics, but much of it is of an 
interdisciplinary nature. The objective is to promote understanding of the issues 
concerned and to make a contribution to ongoing discussions. 
 
L’Europe subit des mutations permanentes. La vie politique, l’économie, le droit, 
mais également les sociétés européennes, changent rapidement. L’Union européenne 
s’inscrit dès lors dans un processus d’adaptation constant. Des défis et des nouvelles 
demandes surviennent sans cesse, provenant à la fois de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur. 
La collection des Cahiers du Collège d’Europe publie les résultats des recherches 
menées sur ces thèmes au Collège d’Europe, au sein de ses deux campus (Bruges et 
Varsovie). Focalisés sur l’Union européenne et le processus d’intégration, ces travaux 
peuvent être spécialisés dans les domaines des sciences politiques, du droit ou de 
l’économie, mais ils sont le plus souvent de nature interdisciplinaire. La collection vise à 
approfondir la compréhension de ces questions complexes et contribue ainsi au débat 
européen. 
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